Harvest-now-decrypt-later: what boards miss
Extended analysis with industry context, action checklists, and Qtangl product tie-ins.
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Urgency
Adversaries don't need to break your crypto today. They can store ciphertext now and decrypt it once quantum computers arrive.
Nation-state and sophisticated actors harvest TLS sessions, backups, and archives knowing future quantum computers will read them. Storage is cheap; breaking RSA today is not required. NIST describes this as harvest now, decrypt later — one reason post-quantum encryption should deploy as soon as feasible.
Healthcare records, financial transaction archives, M&A diligence, and classified-adjacent research often carry 20–50 year confidentiality requirements. Regional banks, payers, and government contractors hold exactly this data profile. Incident response data shows exfiltration timelines compressing — copying ciphertext is faster than breaking it.
If data shelf-life (X) plus migration time (Y) exceeds the time until quantum breaks crypto (Z), you have HNDL exposure today. Mosca turns abstract quantum risk into a planning inequality boards and regulators understand — especially when migration takes five to ten years across a mid-market estate.
Every Qtangl assessment includes Mosca HNDL scoring — mapping your data retention horizon against estimated quantum timeline and migration runway. Quantum-vulnerable does not mean broken today; it means you need inventory and a migration runway now.
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References & further reading
Authoritative primary sources cited in this article. Summaries are our own — follow links for full context.
Last verified 2026-06-03
Deep dive
Extended analysis with industry context, action checklists, and Qtangl product tie-ins.
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Related
When cryptographically relevant quantum computers break today's public-key crypto.
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